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1 Introduction
Over the past 20 years, numerous countries have suﬀered from financial crises followed by
serious economic recessions. Among them, the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s,
the Japanese asset price bubble burst in 1990, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the US
subprime loan crisis in the late 2000s were the most severe.1 They occurred even though
major fundamental economic measures such as growth and inflation rates were fairly sound
just before the crises.
Figure 1 presents the time series of the per capita real gross domestic product (GDP),
stock prices, and land prices in the United States (panel A) and Japan (panel B). The
deviations from the trends of these variables are plotted from 1995 to 2009 in the United
States and from 1985 to 1994 in Japan, and they coincide with asset bubbles.2 An asset
bubble is defined as the diﬀerence between the fundamental and market values of an asset.
In general, it is diﬃcult to identify the fundamental value of an asset correctly. However,
in most cases the bubble component exhibits an explosive movement. Thus, we assume
here that the trend component of an asset price reflects the movement of its fundamental
value and deviations from the trends in the stock and land prices represent their bubble
components. As Figure 1 shows, the United States experienced two economic booms during
this period. The first was the so-called dot-com bubble that burst in 2001. The figure shows
that the burst of the stock price bubble was accompanied by an economic recession. Land
prices were relatively stable during this event. The second is a real estate lending boom that
resulted in the so-called subprime loan crisis from 2007 to 2008. In this crisis, the burst of the
land price bubble was followed by a serious economic downturn and a sharp decline in stock
prices. On the other hand, Japan experienced one economic boom during the period shown,
which was led by a stock price bubble that burst in 1990. This burst was also followed by a
severe economic depression.
These historical observations lead to the following questions. Do asset bubbles pro-
mote economic growth? Why do asset bubbles burst? Why does a bubble burst result in
an economic recession even though fundamental variables such as the technology level and
individuals’ tastes do not seem to change just before a bubble burst?3 To address these ques-
1Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) provide very useful reviews and datasets
on financial crises.
2The deviations from the trends are computed by use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. See Appendix for
details of the data sources.
3To the best of our knowledge, there is little evidence that exogenous negative technological shocks
triggered the bubble burst in past financial crises.
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tions, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with infinitely lived heterogeneous
agents. This research aims to describe a financial crisis accompanied by a bubble burst,
which results in a severe recession, as a rational expectations equilibrium of our dynamic
general equilibrium model. The financial crisis in our model is self-fulfilling in the sense
that rational expectations drive an economy into a financial crisis without any changes in
fundamentals such as the productivity or the individuals’ tastes. In addition, we present an
eﬀective policy to avoid self-fulfilling financial crises.
Traditional growth models dealing with asset bubbles have suggested that asset bubbles
crowd investment out and hinder production (e.g., Tirole, 1985; Weil, 1987; Bertocchi and
Yong, 1995; Kunieda, 2008; Matsuoka and Shibata, 2012). This eﬀect occurs because if
individuals save in the form of an intrinsically useless asset instead of capital, the supply
of capital in the next period decreases. Along this line, Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and
Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson (1993), and Futagami and Shibata (2000) have devel-
oped endogenous growth models with overlapping generations and showed that the growth
rate is lower when asset bubbles appear than when no asset bubbles are present, because of
the crowd-out eﬀect on investment. We may call these growth models with asset bubbles
the first generation models because only the crowd-out eﬀect of asset bubbles on investment
emerges in these models. The weak point of the first generation models is that their results
are not consistent with the empirical observations that asset bubbles seem to stimulate eco-
nomic growth and the bubble burst is likely to result in economic downturns, as shown in
Figure 1.
In contrast, many researchers such as Kocherlakota (2009), Hirano and Yanagawa (2010),
Kiyotaki and Moore (2011), Farhi and Tirole (2011), Martin and Ventura (2011), and Miao
and Wang (2011) have recently developed new dynamic general equilibrium models, in which
asset bubbles promote investment and economic growth, and investigated business cycles
and/or financial crises that cause economic recessions.4 The growth models analyzing this
new trend may be called the second generation models because they focus on the crowd-in
liquidity eﬀect of asset bubbles on investment. Our research belongs to this new literature.
We explicitly introduce financial market imperfections into the model. The assumption
of an imperfect financial market has twofold importance. The first is related to the existence
of asset bubbles. A bubble on an asset is more likely to appear in an economy with an
imperfect financial market than one with a perfect financial market. Theorem 3.3 in Santos
4Olivier (2000) also develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which asset bubbles are growth-
enhancing; however, the model does not study financial crises.
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and Woodford (1997) implies that the necessary condition for an asset bubble to appear is
that for any state price of the asset, the present value of the asset diverges to infinity. From
our model’s perspective, their theorem means that if the equilibrium interest rate is less
than the growth rate of the economy, there is a possibility that an asset bubble will develop.
In a financially constrained economy, the equilibrium interest rate is generically less than
that in a financially unconstrained economy. This is because the demand for borrowing is
smaller in a financially constrained economy than in a financially unconstrained economy.
Then, Stantos and Woodford’s necessary condition for the existence of an asset bubble is
more likely to be satisfied in a financially constrained economy. Once asset bubbles emerge,
the equilibrium interest rate increases because the market supply of capital decreases owing
to the existence of asset bubbles.
The second role of financial market imperfections relates to the liquidity constraints
facing investors. As a result of an agency problem in a financially constrained economy,
individuals’ savings cannot be necessarily invested in good projects yielding high returns,
that is, investment opportunities of high-return projects are not realized in such an economy.
In this situation, if an intrinsically useless asset, such as a paper asset, takes a positive value,
that is, if a bubble on an intrinsically useless asset exists, then the equilibrium interest rate
increases. Thus, the intrinsically useless asset, whose rate of return equals the interest rate,
becomes a beneficial vehicle to store the output value from today to tomorrow.
Holding the intrinsically useless asset, liquidity constrained investors face two conflicting
eﬀects created by asset bubbles. The first is a crowd-out eﬀect on investment. The savings
of individuals in an economy are not only invested in investment projects, which produce
output, but also used for holding the intrinsically useless asset. Therefore, the positively
valued intrinsically useless asset crowds investment out. Holding the intrinsically useless
asset crowds the low-return investment projects out because of the increased interest rate.
If a positively valued intrinsically useless asset, which yields a higher interest rate than the
low-return projects, is carried over to the next period and sold in the financial market to
obtain production resources to invest in high-return projects, the equilibrium growth rates
may increase. This is the second eﬀect, that is, the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect of asset bubbles.
When the financial market is imperfect, the intrinsically useless asset is a beneficial store of
value because it yields a higher interest rate than savings yield in an economy without asset
bubbles.
In the economy of our model, the productivity of investment projects producing general
goods varies among agents, implying that the agents in the economy are heterogeneous in
4
productivity when they engage in production. In equilibrium, we obtain two steady states
under certain conditions. One is a steady state in which the intrinsically useless asset has
no value, which we call a bubbleless steady state. The other is a steady state in which the
intrinsically useless asset has a positive value, which we call a bubbly steady state. Although
both the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect and the crowd-out eﬀect operate in a bubbly equilibrium,
the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect always dominates the crowd-out eﬀect in equilibrium. Thus, the
growth rate in the bubbly steady state is higher than that in the bubbleless steady state.
Therefore, if an asset bubble bursts, the economy will go into a recession.
The aforementioned second generation growth models consider both the crowd-out and
crowd-in liquidity eﬀects of asset bubbles in financially constrained economies. These studies
can be classified into two groups depending on the modeling strategy. The first group
comprising Farhi and Tirole (2011) and Martin and Ventura (2011) employs the overlapping
generations framework of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985) and analyzes the crowd-out
and crowd-in liquidity eﬀects of bubbles. The second group constructs infinitely lived agent
models with heterogeneity across agents in order to analyze the two eﬀects. This group
includes Kocherlakota (2009), Hirano and Yanagawa (2010), Kiyotaki and Moore (2011), and
Miao and Wang (2011). Among them, Miao and Wang (2011) mainly consider bubbles on a
productive asset, whereas the others consider them on an intrinsically useless asset. Along
the latter studies, we analyze macroeconomic implications of bubbles on an intrinsically
useless asset by assuming infinitely lived agents who are heterogeneous in productivity for
general goods production.
It should be noted here that all models other than ours assume a binary distribution with
respect to the productivity diﬀerence. However, our model assumes that the productivity of
agents is continuously distributed among agents. As a result of this continuity in the produc-
tivity distribution, we are able to investigate the global dynamics of the equilibrium interest
rates.5 Clarifying the global dynamics in the economy, we are able to derive a two-state sta-
tionary sunspot equilibrium in which a financial crisis is described as a rational expectations
equilibrium without any changes in fundamental variables. Although Kocherlakota (2009),
Wang and Wen (2010), Farhi and Tirole (2011), Martin and Ventura (2011), and Miao and
Wang (2011) also derive a two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium, they assume from the
beginning of their investigations that one state is bubbleless. In our model, however, the bub-
5Wang and Wen (2010) also assume the continuous productivity distribution; however, they do not
analytically investigate the dynamics of the economy. Although Miao and Wang (2011) investigate the
dynamics of the economy, they study only the local dynamics around the steady states. Moreover, they
develop an infinite horizon model with incomplete financial markets.
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bleless state endogenously appears in the sunspot equilibrium.6 Moreover, only our model in
the second generation discusses the government policy to avoid self-fulfilling financial crises,
although Kocherlakota (2009) and Miao and Wang (2011) discuss the government policy to
restore an economy, which experienced a bubble burst, to a healthy state.7
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present a model in
which agents are ex-ante homogeneous but ex-post heterogeneous because of the productivity
shocks regarding general goods production, and they derive a dynamical system with respect
to the equilibrium interest rate. In section 3, we discuss both the dynamics and steady
states of the economy. Here we derive a condition under which an intrinsically useless asset
has a positive value. In section 4, we describe a financial crisis as a rational expectations
equilibrium. In section 5, we discuss how to avoid self-fulfilling financial crises, and in section
6 we present concluding remarks and discuss a relationship between the suboptimality of
the market equilibrium and the double infinity of commodities and agents studied by Shell
(1971).
2 Model
The economy consists of one unit measure of infinitely lived agents and an infinitely lived
financial intermediary. Time is discrete and goes from 0 to ∞. As will be seen later, only
highly productive agents produce general goods. General goods created at time t are used
interchangeably as physical capital, financial capital, and consumption goods at time t.
However, they are perishable in one period. This implies that the physical capital, which
is used as input for general goods production, depreciates entirely in one period. Financial
capital is used as a resource for borrowing and lending in the financial market.
While the infinitely lived agents maximize their lifetime utility, the infinitely lived finan-
cial intermediary only accommodates borrowers with loans and accepts deposits from savers
to balance its balance sheet.
6Wang and Wen (2010) show that even rational agents are willing to invest in bubbles despite a positive
probability that they will burst. They also show that by calibration exercises, changes in the perceived
systemic risk can generate asset price collapse.
7Furthermore, Kocherlakota (2009) and Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) assume that the future value of an
intrinsically useless asset can be pledged to derive the bubbly equilibrium. By contrast, we assume that only
a part of the net worth currently held by the agents can be pledged.
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2.1 Maximization problem
Each agent is endowed with a production function at time t such that:
yt = AΦt−1kt−1,
where yt is general goods, kt−1 is physical capital, and Φt−1 is productivity at time t. The
productivity Φt−1 is a function of a stochastic event ωt−1, where {ωt−1 ∈ Ω | Φt−1(ωt−1) ≤ Φ}
is an element of a σ-algebra F of a probability space (Ω,F , P ). In other words, Φt−1(ωt−1)
is a random variable received at time t − 1. Following Angeletos (2007), we assume that
the idiosyncratic productivity shocks Φ0(ω0),Φ1(ω1), ... are independent and identically dis-
tributed across both time and agents (the i.i.d. assumption), implying that the distributions
with respect to Φ0,Φ1, ... are all the same and the stochastic events ω0,ω1, ... are also inde-
pendent across both time and agents. Specifically, we assume that Φ has support over [a, b]
or [a,∞), where a ≥ 0 and b <∞, and its cumulative distribution function is given by G(Φ),
where G(Φ) is continuous, diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing on the support.
Let the histories of stochastic events and the idiosyncratic productivity shocks until time
t− 1 be respectively denoted by ωt−1 = {ω0,ω1, ...ωt−1} and Φt−1 = {Φ0,Φ1, ...Φt−1}. Then,
there exists a probability space (Ωt,F t, P t), which is a Cartesian product of t copies of
(Ω,F , P ) such that Φt−1(ωt−1) is a vector function of the history ωt−1 on (Ωt,F t, P t).
Because agents receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks, they are ex-post heterogeneous
although ex-ante homogeneous. Note that production takes one gestation period. In other
words, an idiosyncratic productivity shock Φt−1 with respect to production at time t is
realized at time t − 1. It is assumed that low productivity cannot be insured before the
realization of an idiosyncratic productivity shock because no insurance market exists for the
idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
An agent maximizes the expected lifetime utility of
U0 = E
" ∞X
t=0
βt ln ct(ωt)
¯¯¯
Φ0
#
,
where ct(ωt) is consumption at time t and E[.|Φt] is the expected value of a variable given
an information set Φt at time t. The flow budget constraint of the agent is given by:
kt(ωt) + bt(ωt) = AΦt−1kt−1(ωt−1) + rtbt−1(ωt−1)− ct(ωt) for t ≥ 1, (1)
where bt is a deposit if positive and a debt if negative, and rt is the gross interest rate. At
t = 0, the flow budget constraint is given by k0 + b0 = w0 − c0, where w0 is the initial
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endowment that the agent holds at birth, which is common to all agents. In what follows,
ωt is omitted to save representations, unless the omission is confusing.
If an agent borrows from the financial intermediary, he/she faces a credit constraint.
Following Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005), Aghion et al. (2005), and
Antra´s and Caballero (2009), we assume that the credit constraint is given by
bt ≥ −θat,
where θ ∈ [0,∞) is the measure of the extent of the credit constraint and at := AΦt−1kt−1+
rtbt−1 − ct is his/her saving, or the net worth remaining after he/she consumes at time t.
Henceforth, we call at the net worth.
As a result of the credit constraint, an agent can borrow financial capital from the financial
intermediary only up to θ times his/her net worth. Two types of microfoundations for the
credit constraint are provided in the appendix. Because at = kt + bt from Eq.(1), the credit
constraint is rewritten as
bt ≥ −μkt, (2)
where μ := θ/(1+θ) ∈ [0, 1) is also the measure of the extent of the credit constraint. Lastly,
the non-negativity constraint of physical capital is given by:
kt ≥ 0. (3)
Each agent maximizes his/her expected lifetime utility U0 subject to Eqs.(1)-(3).
2.2 Optimal behaviors of agents
While defining φt := rt+1/A, we note that it is optimal for agents with Φt > φt to invest
in a project, borrow financial capital up to the limit of the credit constraint, and engage in
general goods production. In other words, the flow budget constraints of agents with Φt > φt
at time t and time t+ 1 are, respectively, given by
(1− μ)kt = AΦt−1kt−1 + rtbt−1 − ct,
and
kt+1 + bt+1 = (AΦt − rt+1μ)kt − ct+1.
Therefore, the Euler equation is obtained as follows:
1
ct
= βE
hAΦt − rt+1μ
1− μ
1
ct+1
¯¯Φti. (4)
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Likewise, it is optimal for agents with Φt < φt to deposit a part of their net worth with
the financial intermediary without engaging in general goods production. As such, the flow
budget constraints of agents with Φt < φt at time t and time t+1 are, respectively, given by
bt = AΦt−1kt−1 + rtbt−1 − ct,
and
kt+1 + bt+1 = rt+1bt − ct+1.
The Euler equation is obtained as follows:
1
ct
= βE
h
rt+1
1
ct+1
¯¯Φti. (5)
We note that φt is a cutoﬀ that divides agents into investors and depositors and has a
one-to-one relationship with the interest rate rt+1.
By defining R˜t+1 := max{rt+1, AΦt−rt+1μ1−μ } and from Eqs.(4) and (5), the Euler equations
and the flow budget constraints of all agents for any time t can be rewritten in an intensive
form such that
1
ct
= βE
∙
R˜t+1
1
ct+1
¯¯Φt¸ (6)
and
at+1 = R˜t+1at − ct+1. (7)
Because the lifetime utility function is log-linear, it follows from Eqs.(6) and (7), and the
transversality condition that the equilibrium dynamic equation of net worth at of an agent
is given by:8
at+1 = βR˜t+1at. (8)
2.3 Financial Intermediary
Following Grandmont (1983) and Rochon and Polemarchakis (2006), we assume that the
financial sector is competitive and thus the representative financial intermediary cannot
gain profits from its business. As assumed in the previous section, the financial intermediary
imposes credit constraints on agents. Besides, it accepts deposits from agents and lends
financial capital to investors. The financial intermediary purchases an intrinsically useless
asset with the excess total saving.9
8Eq.(8) is obtained as follows. From Eq.(7), we have E[at+1/ct+1|Φt]=atE[R˜t+1/ct+1|Φt]−1. Substituting
Eq.(6) into this equation, we have at/ct=βE[at+1/ct+1|Φt] + β. From this equation and the law of iterated
expectations, we obtain at/ct=βτE[at+τ/ct+τ |Φt]+β + β2 + ...+ βτ . From the transversality condition, we
have limτ→∞ βτE[at+τ/ct+τ |Φt] = 0. Therefore, at/ct = β/(1− β) for all t ≥ 0 and thus at+1 = βR˜t+1at.
9In the current model, we assume that the financial intermediary purchases an intrinsically useless asset.
This assumption is only for convenience and does not change our results.
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The balance sheet of the financial intermediary is given by:
Lt + Bt = Dt,
where Lt and Dt are aggregate loans and deposits, respectively. We assume that the nominal
supply of the intrinsically useless asset is constant and is given byM . Accordingly, it follows
that ptM = Bt where pt is the price of the intrinsically useless asset measured by the general
goods at time t. The intrinsically useless asset is freely disposable. Therefore, Bt is non-
negative. Because an asset bubble is defined as the diﬀerence between the fundamental and
market values of an asset, if Bt is strictly greater than zero, we say that a bubble exists on
the intrinsically useless asset. Note that for this asset to have a positive value, it must hold
that pt/pt−1 ≥ rt. Otherwise, the financial intermediary does not buy the asset. Moreover,
because there is no opportunity for the financial intermediary to gain profits, it follows that
pt/pt−1 = rt in equilibrium if the asset has a positive value. Therefore, we have a dynamic
equation with respect to Bt as follows:
Bt = rtBt−1. (9)
Aggregating Eq.(1) across all agents, we find that Eq.(9) holds if and only if the goods
market clears.
2.4 Aggregation
We assume that the law of large numbers can be applied to the population in the economy.
Because at = βR˜tat−1 from Eq.(8), the net worth at of an agent at time t is given by:
at = β(AΦt−1kt−1 + rtbt−1).
Note that the distributions of Φt−1kt−1 and rtbt−1 across agents are independent of the
realization of Φt due to the i.i.d. assumption regarding {Φt}∞t=0. Applying the law of large
numbers to the population in the economy, we obtain the aggregate net worth a˜t(Φt) across
the agents whose productivity realization is Φt as follows:
a˜t(Φt) :=
Z
Ωt−1
at(ωt)dP t−1(ωt−1) = β
Z
Ωt−1
(AΦt−1kt−1(ωt−1) + rtbt−1(ωt−1))dP t−1(ωt−1).
= β(Yt + rtBt−1), (10)
where Yt :=
R
Ωt−1 AΦt−1kt−1(ωt−1)dP t−1(ωt−1) is the total output and Bt−1 = Dt−1−Lt−1 =R
Ωt−1 bt−1(ωt−1)dP t−1(ωt−1) is the intrinsically useless asset held by the financial intermediary.
Likewise, because the credit constraint (2) is binding for the agents with Φt > φt, the
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aggregate borrowing, −b˜t(Φt), across agents whose productivity realization is Φt > φt is
given by:
−b˜t(Φt) = μ
1− μ a˜t(Φt) =
μβ
1− μ(Yt + rtBt−1) (11)
and the aggregate investment, k˜t(Φt), across agents whose productivity realization is Φt > φt
is given by
k˜t(Φt) = a˜t(Φt)− b˜t(Φt) = β
1− μ(Yt + rtBt−1). (12)
.
On the other hand, the aggregate deposit, b˜t(Φt), across agents whose productivity real-
ization is Φt < φt, which is equal to a˜t(Φt), is given by
b˜t(Φt) = β(Yt + rtBt−1). (13)
Note that the right-hand sides of Eqs.(10)-(13) are independent of the realization of Φt
because of the law of large numbers and the i.i.d. assumption regarding {Φt}∞t=0.
From the balance sheet of the representative financial intermediary, we have
Bt = Dt − Lt =
Z
E
b˜t(Φt)dP (ωt) +
Z
Ω/E
b˜t(Φt)dP (ωt)
= β(Yt + rtBt−1)G(φt)− μ
1− μ , (14)
where E = {ωt ∈ Ω | Φt(ωt) ≤ φt}. Multiplying AΦt on both sides of Eq.(12) and aggregating
this equation across all producers, we obtain the total output Yt+1 as follows:Z
Ω/E
AΦtk˜t(Φt)dP (ωt) =
Z
Ω/E
βAΦt
1− μ (Yt + rtBt−1)dP (ωt)
⇐⇒ Yt+1 =
βAF (φt)
1− μ (Yt + rtBt−1) (15)
where F (φt) := R∞φt ΦtdG(Φt).
2.5 Dynamical system
The dynamical system of this economy consists of Eqs.(9), (14), and (15). It is straightfor-
ward to derive the dynamic equations for the cutoﬀ φt and the intrinsically useless asset,
respectively, as follows:
G(φt)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ) =
φt−1(G(φt−1)− μ)
βF (φt−1) (16)
and
Bt = Aφt−1Bt−1. (17)
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From Eq.(14), we note that when G(φt) = μ, the intrinsically useless asset has no value. In
this case, the total deposit equalizes with the total loan on the balance sheet of the financial
intermediary. The growth rate of the aggregate output is given by
Γt+1 := Yt+1
Yt
=
AβF (φt)
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ) . (18)
In a competitive equilibrium, the economy is recursively expressed by sequences {φt, Bt, Yt}
such that for all t ≥ 1, these three sequences satisfy the diﬀerence equations (16), (17) and
(18).
3 Steady states and dynamic behavior
3.1 Steady states
If we know the dynamic behavior of φt, we know the dynamic behavior of Bt and the
equilibrium growth rates of the output. Therefore, we intensively analyze Eq.(16). Note
from Eq.(14) that the intrinsically useless asset has a positive value if G(φt) > μ provided
that Yt is strictly greater than zero. Therefore, our discussion about Eq.(16) is focused on
the case in which G(φt) ≥ μ, and thus, we restrict the domain of the dynamical system of
Eq.(16) to [G−1(μ),∞) because the intrinsically useless asset is freely disposable.
First, to investigate the existence of the steady states in Eq.(16), we define φ∗ and φ∗∗,
which, respectively, satisfy
G(φ∗) = μ
1− μ− β(G(φ∗∗)− μ) = βF (φ∗∗)/φ∗∗.
Lemma 1 Both φ∗ and φ∗∗ are uniquely determined.
Proof : See the appendix.
Although φ∗ and φ∗∗ can be rewritten as the functions of the parameters of μ and β and
the parameters of the distribution of Φ such that φ∗(μ;Θ) and φ∗∗(μ, β;Θ), where Θ is the
parameter set of the distribution of Φ, we write just φ∗ and φ∗∗ to save notations.
As seen in Figure 2, the value of φ∗∗ is determined by the intersection of the x axis and
the function H(x) := βF (x)/x − [1 − μ − β(G(x) − μ)], which is decreasing with respect
to x, as demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix. The dynamical system
of Eq.(16) has two steady-state equilibria, φ∗ and φ∗∗, if and only if φ∗∗ is strictly greater
than φ∗. This is because the domain of the dynamical system of Eq.(16) is [φ∗,∞) because
of the free disposability of the intrinsically useless asset. As shown in Figure 2, φ∗∗ is
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strictly greater than φ∗ if and only if H(φ∗) > 0, or equivalently (1 − G(φ∗))φ∗ < βF (φ∗).
In this case, the intrinsically useless asset has a positive value in the steady state φ∗∗.
Meanwhile, the dynamical system of Eq.(16) has only one steady-state equilibrium if and
only if (1−G(φ∗))φ∗ ≥ βF (φ∗). Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 Consider the dynamical system of Eq.(16). (i) There exists only one steady
state, φ∗, such that G(φ∗) = μ if and only if (1 − G(φ∗))φ∗ ≥ βF (φ∗). Moreover, the
intrinsically useless asset has no value in this steady state. (ii) There exist two steady states
φ∗ and φ∗∗, where φ∗∗ > φ∗, such that G(φ∗) = μ and 1−μ−β(G(φ∗∗)−μ) = βF (φ∗∗)/φ∗∗ if
and only if (1−G(φ∗))φ∗ < βF (φ∗). Moreover, the intrinsically useless asset has a positive
value in the steady state of φ∗∗, implying that asset bubbles appear in this steady state.
Proof. The discussion just before proposition 1 demonstrates the claims of this propo-
sition. ¤
In what follows, we call the steady state φ∗∗ a bubbly steady state if it exists and the
steady state φ∗ a bubbleless steady state.
3.1.1 Examples
First, suppose that Φ has a Pareto distribution such that:
G(Φ) =
½
1−
¡
a
Φ
¢x
if Φ ≥ a
0 if 0 ≤ Φ < a,
where x > 1. In this case, F (Φ)/Φ = x(1−G(Φ))/(x−1). From Proposition 1, if (1−β)x < 1,
then the bubbly and bubbleless steady states exist in the economy. There are several findings
with the Pareto distribution. First, we find that the existence condition for both steady states
is independent of the extent of credit constraints, μ ∈ [0, 1). Second, assuming that the mean
of the Pareto distribution is constant and x is greater than 2, a decrease in x leads to a mean
preserving spread of the Pareto distribution.10 Therefore, if the Pareto distribution exhibits
a mean preserving spread associated with a decrease in x, the bubbly steady state is more
likely to appear. Intuitively, if the number of less productive agents increases as x decreases,
the supply of deposits increases and the intrinsically useless asset is more likely to be held by
the financial intermediary. The asset plays a role of insurance that secures a higher return
to depositors in this case than when the financial intermediary does not hold it. Third, if
the subjective discount factor is too small, the bubbly steady state does not appear. This is
because if the agents in the economy consider their future consumption unimportant, they
10If x ≤ 2, we cannot discuss a mean preserving spread of the Pareto distribution because if x ≤ 2, the
variance of the Pareto distribution does not exist.
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need not store their output today for their future consumption. Therefore,the supply of
deposits decreases and the financial intermediary is unlikely to hold the intrinsically useless
asset.
Now, suppose that Φ has a uniform distribution such that:
G(Φ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if 0 ≤ Φ < a
Φ−a
2(m−a) if a ≤ Φ ≤ 2m− a
1 if Φ ≥ 2m− a,
where m is the mean of the distribution and the support of the distribution is [a, 2m − a].
In this case, φ∗ = 2(m − a)μ + a and F (φ∗) = (1 − μ)[(m − a)μ + m]. Therefore, from
Proposition 1, both the bubbly and bubbleless steady states exist if and only if 0 < μ <
β/(2− β)− [(1− β)a]/[(2− β)(m− a)]. Diﬀering from the case of the Pareto distribution,
this condition is dependent on the extent of credit constraints μ. This existence condition for
asset bubbles can be discussed from the perspective of Theorem 3.3 in Santos and Woodford
(1997). From Eq.(18), the equilibrium growth rate in the bubbleless steady state is computed
as Γ∗ := Aβ[(m − a)μ + m] and because rt+1 = Aφt, the equilibrium interest rate in the
bubbleless steady state is computed as r∗ := A[2μ(m − a) + a]. Therefore, if μ is so small
that μ < β/(2 − β) − [(1 − β)a]/[(2 − β)(m − a)], then the equilibrium interest rate in the
steady state is smaller than the equilibrium growth rate. This is because the severer credit
constraints reduce the demand for financial capital, and thus the equilibrium interest rate
decreases. This consequence is consistent with the necessary condition for a bubble on the
intrinsically useless asset to appear, which can be deduced from Theorem 3.3 in Santos and
Woodford (1997).
As in the case of the Pareto distribution, if the uniform distribution exhibits a mean
preserving spread induced by a decrease in a, the bubbly steady state is more likely to
appear. Lastly, the eﬀect of a decrease in the subjective discount factor β is also the same
as in the case of the Pareto distribution.
We particularly find from these two examples that the appearance of a bubble on the
intrinsically useless asset depends on the classes of distributions as well as the fundamen-
tal variables such as the agents’ productivity, extent of credit constraints, and subjective
discount factor. For instance, even though two diﬀerent productivity distributions have the
same mean and variance, asset bubbles can appear in one economy but not in the other if
the two economies are endowed with the same fundamental variables but with the diﬀerent
productivity distributions.
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3.2 Dynamics
Now, to investigate the dynamic behavior of the economy, we draw phase diagrams. We de-
fine functions Ψ(φt) := G(φt)−μ1−μ−β(G(φt)−μ) , which is the left-hand side of Eq.(16), and Λ(φt−1) :=
φt−1(G(φt−1)−μ)
βF (φt−1) , which is the right-hand side. Ψ(φt) and Λ(φt−1) are respectively approximated
around the bubbleless steady state such that:
Ψ(φt) ≈ G
0(φ∗)
1−G(φ∗)(φt − φ
∗)
and
Λ(φt−1) ≈ φ
∗G0(φ∗)
βF (φ∗) (φt−1 − φ
∗).
From these approximations, we obtain the local dynamical system with respect to φt around
the bubbleless steady state as follows:
φt − φ∗ = φ
∗(1−G(φ∗))
βF (φ∗) (φt−1 − φ
∗).
From this equation and Proposition 1, we note that if only the bubbleless steady state
exsits in the economy, this bubbleless state is locally unstable, whereas if both bubbly and
bubbleless steady states exist in the economy, the bubbleless steady state is locally stable.
On the other hand, Ψ(φt) and Λ(φt−1) are, respectively, approximated around the bubbly
steady state such that
Ψ(φt) ≈ φ
∗∗G0(φ∗∗)F (φ∗∗) + (φ∗∗)2G0(φ∗∗)(G(φ∗∗)− μ)
β(F (φ∗∗))2 (φt − φ
∗∗)
and
Λ(φt−1) ≈ [(G(φ
∗∗)− μ) + φ∗∗G0(φ∗∗)]F (φ∗∗) + (φ∗∗)2G0(φ∗∗)(G(φ∗∗)− μ)
βF (φ∗∗)2 (φt−1 − φ
∗∗).
Therefore, the local dynamical system with respect to φt around the bubbly steady state is
given by
φt − φ∗∗ =
h (G(φ∗∗)− μ)F (φ∗∗)
φ∗∗G0(φ∗∗)F (φ∗∗) + (φ∗∗)2G0(φ∗∗)(G(φ∗∗)− μ) + 1
i
(φt−1 − φ∗∗).
We note from this equation that if the bubbly steady state exists, it is locally unstable
because the coeﬃcient of φt−1 − φ∗∗ in the right-hand side is greater than one.
The stability of the two steady states can also be investigated using phase diagrams.
Both Ψ(φt) and Λ(φt−1) are increasing functions. We can easily show that limφt→∞Ψ(φt) =
1/(1 − β) and limφt−1→∞ Λ(φt−1) = ∞. Therefore, configurations of Ψ(φt) and Λ(φt−1) and
the dynamic behaviors of the economy are described in Figure 3.
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From Eqs.(9) and (14), we have ptM = β[G(φt)−G(φ∗)]Yt/[1− μ− β(G(φt)−G(φ∗))].
Because the price of the intrinsically useless asset is non-predetermined, φt is also non-
predetermined. As noted from Panel A in Figure 3, if only the bubbleless steady state
exists, this steady state is unstable. Because φt is not a predetermined variable, only the
bubbleless steady state is a perfect foresight equilibrium and there is no transitional dynamics
in this case. The economy does not experience endogenous fluctuations caused by the agents’
expectations.
On the other hand, if both the bubbly and bubbleless steady states exist, as discussed
above, the bubbleless steady state is locally stable and the bubbly steady state is unsta-
ble. In this case, as seen in Panel B in Figure 3, equilibrium is locally determinate in the
neighborhood of the bubbly steady state. In other words, if one focuses the analysis on the
small neighborhood of φ∗∗, the bubbly steady state is only the perfect foresight equilibrium.
This implies that even though an exogenous shock associated with fundamental variables,
such as productivity and the agents’ tastes, occurs, the bubbly steady state equilibrium is
always achievable without any excess volatility driven by the agents’ expectations. However,
it is also true that if we consider the global dynamic behavior of the economy, there exist
uncountably many equilibrium trajectories, originating from the left neighborhood of the
bubbly steady state, which monotonically converge to the bubbleless steady state. In other
words, if we consider the global dynamics of the economy, equilibrium is indeterminate and
thus endogenous fluctuations caused by the agents’ expectations may appear. In section 4,
we investigate the possibility of a sunspot equilibrium.
3.3 Growth rate comparison
From Eq.(18), the growth rate Γ∗ in the bubbleless steady state and the growth rate Γ∗∗ in
the bubbly steady state are computed as
Γ∗ = βAF (φ
∗)
1−G(φ∗) (19)
and
Γ∗∗ = Aφ∗∗, (20)
respectively.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the bubbly steady state exists. The growth rate in the bubbly
steady state is strictly greater than that in the bubbleless steady state. Moreover, the growth
rate in the bubbly steady state is the highest for any φt ≥ φ∗.
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Proof: See the appendix.
The consequences in Proposition 2 contrast with those in the first generation growth
models with asset bubbles. In the first generation literature (e.g., Tirole, 1985; Grossman
and Yanagawa, 1992; Saint-Paul, 1992; Futagami and Shibata, 2000), a positively valued
intrinsically useless asset always reduces the growth rate in an economy because asset bubbles
crowd investment out. However, in our model, there is a crowd-in liquidity eﬀect of asset
bubbles on investment as well as a crowd-out eﬀect. From Eqs.(9) and (14), we obtain the
bubble to output ratio (the Bt/Yt ratio) as follows:
Bt
Yt
=
β(G(φt)−G(φ∗))
1− μ− β(G(φt)−G(φ∗)) .
We find from this equation that the further is the distance between φt and φ∗, the greater
is the Bt/Yt ratio. Proposition 2 implies that if φt is greater than φ∗ but less than φ∗∗,
the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect of asset bubbles dominates the crowd-out eﬀect, whereas if φt
is greater than φ∗∗, the crowd-out eﬀect bubbles dominates the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect.
However, there is no equilibrium such that φt > φ∗∗ as observed in Panel B in Figure 3.
Therefore, if the bubbly steady state exists, the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect always dominates
the crowd-out eﬀect in equilibrium. In other words, the greater is the Bt/Yt ratio, the higher
is the growth rate in equilibrium if the bubbly steady state exists.
In the financial market, in response to the crowd-out eﬀect of asset bubbles, the interest
rate increases. Although the increase in the equilibrium interest rate reduces the number
of investors, the existence of asset bubbles crowds the less productive agents out, and they
become depositors. Moreover, these depositors acquire higher returns when asset bubbles
exist than when they do not exist. Some depositors who are less productive agents today
will become productive investors tomorrow. This implies that agents who have turned into
highly productive investors have enough liquidity, which can be used for their investment
projects because of the higher returns to deposits. This is the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect of
asset bubbles. On the other hand, if asset bubbles do not exists, the less productive agents
will obtain only the lower returns to deposits. In this case, these agents who will turn into
highly productive agents do not have enough liquidity to invest in projects. The crowd-in
liquidity eﬀect of asset bubbles is similarly discussed in the second generation models with
asset bubbles (e.g., Hirano and Yanagawa, 2010; Farhi and Tirole, 2011; Martin and Ventura,
2011; and Miao and Wang, 2011).
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We conclude this section with a remark on the constrained dynamic eﬃciency.11 The
bubbleless steady state is constrained dynamically ineﬃcient if both the bubbly and bub-
bleless steady states exist. Because βct = (1− β)at for each agent, per capita consumption
is obtained as c˜t := (1 − β)(Yt + rtBt−1) = (1 − β)(Yt + Bt) for t ≥ 1, where the second
equality holds because of Eq.(9) and c˜0 = (1 − β)w0. We note that the growth rates of
Yt and c˜t are the same in the bubbleless steady state and those of Yt, Bt, and c˜t are the
same in the bubbly steady state. From Proposition 2, the growth rate in the bubbly steady
state is the highest for any φt ≥ φ∗. Obviously, this means that allocative ineﬃciency in
the bubbleless economy is corrected by the existence of asset bubbles. In Tirole (1985) the
existence of asset bubbles also corrects allocative ineﬃciency in the bubbleless steady-state
equilibrium if the bubbleless steady-state equilibrium is dynamically ineﬃcient. However,
the mechanism of the correction of ineﬃciency in our model diﬀers from that in Tirole’s
model. While in Tirole’s model only the crowd-out eﬀect is important for correcting the
allocative ineﬃciency, in our model, both the crowd-out and the crowd-in liquidity eﬀects
have importance. In our model, in response to the crowd-out eﬀect, unproductive agents do
not invest in projects and thus physical capital is not ineﬃciently used. In response to the
crowd-in liquidity eﬀect, the agents who changed into the highly productive today from the
unproductive yesterday can utilize many production resources.
Unlike the model of Tirole and Farhi (2011), constrained dynamic eﬃciency and con-
strained Pareto eﬃciency are not the same concept in our model because of the ex-post
heterogeneity of the agents.12 Therefore, the existence of asset bubbles might not be able to
lead to Pareto improvements due to the increased interest rates.
4 Sunspots and financial crisis
To investigate sunspot equilibria, we focus our analysis on the case in which the bubbly steady
state appears. As discussed in the previous section, equilibrium is globally indeterminate
in this case. In this section, we shall prove the existence of a two-state stationary sunspot
equilibrium, which leads the economy to a financial crisis without any changes in fundamental
variables such as productivity or the agents’ tastes.
11See Kunieda (2008) and Tirole and Farhi (2011) for the definition of constrained dynamic eﬃciency.
12Here, we consider ex-post Pareto eﬃciency.
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4.1 Sunspot variables and the equilibrium dynamics
We assume that there is a sunspot variable zt that follows a two-state Markov process whose
support is {0, 1} such that:
Pr(zt = 1|zt−1 = 1) = πa
Pr(zt = 0|zt−1 = 0) = πb,
where πa and πb∈ (0, 1] are the transition probabilities of the Markov chain and we as-
sume that z0 = 1. Let the history of sunspot events up to time t be z
t = {z0, z1, ..., zt}.
The sunspots events are independent of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks and they are
common among agents.
We assume that agents have rational expectations for the interest rate rt(zt) given the
sunspot history zt−1. Because the stochastic process of {zt}∞t=0 is a Markov process, the
rationally expected value of rt(zt) is given by E[rt(zt)|zt−1]. This implies that agents with
AΦt−1 > E[rt(zt)|zt−1] invest in a project at time t− 1, borrowing financial capital from the
financial intermediary, whereas agents with AΦt−1 < E[rt(zt)|zt−1] deposit their financial
capital with the financial intermediary at time t − 1. In other words, the cutoﬀ for the
realization of productivity, which divides agents into investors and lenders, is denoted by
φt−1 = E[rt(zt)|zt−1]/A. Note that although φt−1 is a stochastic variable before the realization
of zt−1, it becomes a deterministic variable when zt−1 is fulfilled.
The maximization problem of an agent is almost the same as in section 2 except that
we replace notations such as kt(ωt) and E(.|Φt) with kt(ωt, zt) and E(.|Φt, zt), respectively.
Hence, we will not insert the maximization problem here. Given the sunspot history zt−1
and from the solutions of the maximization problem and the market clearing conditions, the
dynamic behavior of the economy is expressed by almost the same equations as Eqs.(9), (14),
and (15) because of the law of large numbers and the i.i.d. assumption regarding Φt, except
that rt(zt) is a random variable.
13 We insert the new equations regarding the aggregate
variables below:
Bt(z
t) = rt(zt)Bt−1(z
t−1), (21)
13Now that the rational expectations for the future interest rate Aφt−1 = E[rt(zt)|zt−1] diﬀers from the
fulfilled interest rate rt(zt), some investors may default. We avoid such a situation by imposing the following
assumption. Because the net return of an investor at time t is given by AΦt−1− rt(zt)μ, if Aφt−1 ≥ rt(zt)μ,
no investors default. Because the minimum value that φt−1 can take in equilibrium is φ∗, the suﬃcient
condition for no investors to default is φ∗ ≥ μrt(zt)/A. We assume this condition in what follows. In
our two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium, it holds that sup rt(zt) = Aφ∗∗. Thus, we may assume that
φ∗ ≥ μφ∗∗. When μ is relatively small, this condition is satisfied. For instance, in the case of the Pareto
distribution discussed in section 3.1, if μx ≤ (1− β)(x− 1)/β, this assumption holds.
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Bt(z
t) = β(Yt(zt−1) + rt(zt)Bt−1(zt−1))G(φt)− μ
1− μ , (22)
Yt+1(z
t) =
βAF (φt)
1− μ (Yt(z
t−1)) + rt(zt)Bt−1(z
t−1))). (23)
4.2 Stationary sunspot equilibrium
From Eqs.(21), (22), and (23), we obtain:
G(φt)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ) =
rt(zt)(G(φt−1)− μ)
AβF (φt−1) , (24)
and
Γt+1 = Yt+1(zt)/Yt(zt−1) = AβφtF (φt)
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ) , (25)
Taking an expectation for both sides of Eq.(24) given the sunspot event zt−1, we obtain:
E
h G(φt)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ)
¯¯¯
zt−1
i
=
φt−1(G(φt−1)− μ)
βF (φt−1) . (26)
In what follows, we consider a stationary sunspot equilibrium. In a two-state stationary
sunspot equilibrium, the interest rates take only two values: rH = r(zt = 1) and r
L = r(zt =
0), where rH > rL. For t ≥ 1, we define the two states of φt in the stationary sunspot
equilibrium as follows:
φa : = E[r(zt)/A|zt−1 = 1] = [πarH + (1− πa)rL]/A (27)
φb : = E[r(zt)/A|zt−1 = 0] = [(1− πb)rH + πbrL]/A, (28)
where we assume that πa > 1− πb and thus φa > φb so that the economy is initially in the
high growth state.14 We also assume that πa < 1.15
Using φa and φb, Eq.(26) is rewritten as the following two equations associated with a
two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium depending upon the realization of zt−1:
πa G(φ
a)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φa)− μ) + (1− π
a)
G(φb)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φb)− μ) =
φa(G(φa)− μ)
βF (φa) . (29)
(1− πb) G(φ
a)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φa)− μ) + π
b G(φb)− μ
1− μ− β(G(φb)− μ) =
φb(G(φb)− μ)
βF (φb) . (30)
Given the Markov transition probabilities, πa and πb, the two-state stationary sunspot
equilibrium of the economy consists of four-tuple {φa,φb, rH , rL} such that {φa,φb, rH , rL}
satisfies Eqs. (27)-(30). In the stationary sunspot equilibrium, given the sunspot history
14If φa < φb, we will obtain only an equilibrium such that the economy stays in the steady state φa = φ∗
forever because z0 = 1 although we do not provide the analysis for this case.
15We will note from Eqs.(29) and (30) that if πa = 1, the economy stays in the steady state φ∗∗ forever
because z0 = 1.
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zt−1, the realization of zt in each time recursively determines the output Yt+1(z
t) following
Eq.(24) and the intrinsically useless asset Bt(z
t) following Eq.(21).
Proposition 3 characterizes the two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium in our economy.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (1−G(φ∗))φ∗ < βF (φ∗), implying that the bubbly steady state
equilibrium exists without extrinsic uncertainty. Suppose also that 1 − πb < πa < 1. Then,
there exists only a two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium {φa,φb, rH , rL} such that φb = φ∗
and φa ∈ (φ∗,φ∗∗) with πb = 1, where {rH , rL} are functions of {φa,φb} satisfying Eqs.(27)
and (28).
Proof: See the appendix.
For the two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium to exist, it must hold that πb = 1 and
φb = φ∗. The proof of Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 4. In particular, to obtain the
transition probability, πb, that is less than one and the state φb that is not equal to φ∗, Λ(φb)
must be an internally dividing point between Ψ(φa) and Ψ(φb). However, this is impossible
because Ψ(φa) > Ψ(φb) > Λ(φb). The only possible case to hold in Eq.(30) is that πb = 1
and φb = φ∗.
In the two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium in the economy, one state is the bubbleless
steady-state equilibrium of φ∗, where the growth rate Γ∗ is the minimum in φt ∈ [φ∗,φ∗∗].
Once the economy falls from the high-growth state of φa to the low-growth state of φb = φ∗,
it is never restored to the high-growth state. The self-fulfilling financial crisis in our model
accompanies the bubble burst. In the extant second generation literature on asset bubbles,
such as Kocherlakota (2009), Farhi and Tirole (2011), Martin and Ventura (2011), and
Miao and Wang (2011), this type of financial crisis equilibrium is investigated. However,
they assume from the beginning of their investigations that one state is bubbleless. Diﬀering
from them, the bubbleless state in our stationary sunspot equilibrium endogenously appears.
We note that as πa is close to one, the probability of the occurrence of a self-fulfilling
financial crisis approaches zero and φa is close to φ∗∗, which leads the economy to the highest
growth as shown in Proposition 2. When the US subprime loan crisis occurred in late 2000,
it was said to be the century’s greatest crisis. From our model’s perspective, we can consider
that πa was very close but not equal to one before the subprime loan crisis.
5 Avoiding self-fulfilling financial crises
In this section, borrowing the idea proposed by Tirole (1985), we present a government
policy to avoid self-fulfilling financial crises. If the bubbleless steady-state equilibrium is
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eliminated by a government policy and the bubbly steady-state equilibrium becomes a unique
equilibrium, self-fulfilling financial crises never occur.16 Tirole (1985) demonstrates that if the
intrinsically useless asset is backed by the government, the bubbly steady-state equilibrium
becomes a unique equilibrium.
We assume that the government imposes a tax on the agents’ net income in Eq.(1) as
follows:
kt(ωt) + bt(ωt) = [AΦt−1kt−1(ωt−1) + rtbt−1(ωt−1)](1− τt)− ct(ωt) for t ≥ 1, (31)
where τt ∈ (0, 1) is the tax rate at time t, which is common across agents. From Eq.(31), the
aggregate tax is given by τt(Yt + rtBt−1). We assume that the government purchases ²Yt/pt
of the intrinsically useless asset at time t and thus the dynamic equation of Bt becomes:
Bt = rtBt−1 − ²Yt. (32)
Note that ² is independent of time and assumed to be infinitesimal. All computations to
derive the equilibrium dynamics with respect to φt are almost the same as in subsection 2.4.
Because the agents have to pay tax, we have at = βR˜t(1− τt)at−1, and thus,
at = β(AΦt−1kt−1 + rtbt−1)(1− τt).
Therefore, we obtain
Bt = βG(φt)− μ
1− μ (Yt + rtBt−1)(1− τt), (33)
and
Yt+1 =
βAF (φt)
1− μ (Yt + rtBt−1)(1− τt). (34)
Assuming a balanced government budget, we have τt(Yt + rtBt−1) = ²Yt. Applying Eq.(32)
to the government’s budget constraint, we get
1− τt = Yt + Bt
Yt + Bt + ²Yt
.
Thus, Eqs.(33) and (34), respectively, become
Bt = βG(φt)− μ
1− μ (Yt + Bt), (35)
and
Yt+1 =
βAF (φt)
1− μ (Yt + Bt). (36)
16The idea that the government policy eliminates a bad steady-state equilibrium is employed in other
areas in macroeconomics. For instance, Benhabib et al. (2002) propose a fiscal policy that eliminates the
low-inflation steady state to avoid liquidity traps.
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From Eqs.(32), (35) and (36) and using rt = Aφt−1, we obtain:
(1− ²)(G(φt)− μ) + ²(1− μ)/β
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ) =
φt−1(G(φt−1)− μ)
βF (φt−1) . (37)
We note that the right-hand side of Eq.(37) is the same as that of Eq.(16), whereas the
left-hand side is diﬀerent because ² is strictly greater than zero. Figure 5 presents a phase
diagram of the dynamic behavior of φt. We find from Figure 5 that the equilibrium is
globally determinate, implying that only the bubbly steady state φ∗∗∗ is a unique perfect
foresight equilibrium in this economy. In this case, self-fulfilling financial crises never occur.
Moreover, the economy experiences an almost highest growth rate because ² is infinitesimal.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have described a self-fulfilling financial crisis accompanied by a bubble burst as a rational
expectations equilibrium. In our model, the crowd-in liquidity eﬀect of asset bubbles on in-
vestments dominates the crowd-out eﬀect in equilibrium. Therefore, a self-fulfilling financial
crisis always results in a severe economic recession. This result is consistent with empirical
evidence observed in the history of financial crises.
We conclude this paper with a remark on the relationship between our model and the
double infinity of commodities and agents that was studied by Shell (1971). The subopti-
mality of our growth model can be reinterpreted from the perspective of the double infinity
of commodities and agents. As clarified by Cozzi (2001), even though each agent in an
economy is assumed to be infinitely lived, the economy would exhibit the double infinity
feature as in the overlapping generations models. To consider this more concretely, suppose
that μ = 0, that is, investors cannot borrow at all. If the insurance market for the agents’
incomes is complete, consumption in each time is the same across agents even though they
are ex-post heterogeneous in their productivity because they are ex-ante homogeneous. In
this case, each agent decides once and for all on the schedule of his/her lifetime consumption
and savings at time zero as in the manner of the Arrow-Debreu model. Then, equilibrium
in this economy is constrained Pareto optimal. However, there is no insurance market in the
economy in our model, and each agent stepwise decides on the plan of his/her consumption
and savings at each point in time when he/she acquires information about his/her produc-
tivity. As a result of this stepwise decision making, an identical infinitely lived agent seems
to be a newly born person today who diﬀers from the person yesterday, given a bequest
from yesterday’s person. In other words, by the combination of the incomplete insurance
market and the imperfect financial market, the lifetime of an infinitely lived agent is cut
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into countably many pieces as if he/she turned into countably many agents. In this sense,
there is double infinity of commodities and agents in our economy. In response to the double
infinity, asset bubbles could appear under certain parameter conditions and indeterminacy
and sunspots are possible. Although asset bubbles have a role in insuring agents’ incomes,
they can only partially insure the incomes as demonstrated in Cozzi (2001).
Appendix
Data description for Figure 1
Data were drawn from various databases. We gathered the annual data for the United States
and Japan over a period from 1980 to 2009. We obtained the data for per capita real GDP in
the two countries from the Penn World Table 7.0 database created by Heston et al. (2011),
which is titled “PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres), derived from growth rates of
c, g, i, at 2005 constant prices.” The data for land prices in Japan were collected from the
Nationwide Urban Land Price Index database created by the Japan Real Estate Institute.
In particular, we used the land price index of six major cities in the dataset. The data for
land prices in the United States were assembled from the dataset titled “CSW-based price
index: aggregate land data, quarterly, 1975:1-2011:1,” which is created by Morris A. Davis
and Jonathan Heathcote (2007). The data for the stock price in Japan were drawn from
the Nikkei Indexes, which is a database for various Japanese stock price indexes created by
Nikkei Inc. In particular, we used the annual data from the Nikkei Stock Average. For stock
prices in the United States, we used the S&P Composite Stock Price Index. The data for
this index were downloaded from Robert Shiller’s web page at: http://www.econ.yale.edu/
shiller/data.htm. To obtain the real variables, all the land and stock price indexes were
deflated by the consumer price index, which was collected from the database of the World
Development Indicators created by the World Bank (2011). We converted all the obtained
real variables into the indexes using 2000 as the base year. Applying the Hodrick-Prescott
filter to these converted indexes, we obtained the deviations from the trends of each variable.
Microfoundations for the credit constraint (2)
Microfoundation I
Following Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005) and Aghion et al. (2005), we
assume that financial market imperfections arise simply from the possibility that borrowers
may not pay oﬀ their obligations.
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The net worth that each investor prepares for his/her investment project by his/her
own is at. If he/she borrows −bt from the financial intermediary, his/her total resources to
invest are kt = at− bt at time t. The return on one unit of investment is AΦt. If an investor
consistently pays oﬀ his/her obligations, then he/she will acquire a net income, AΦtkt+rt+1bt
at time t+1. Meanwhile, if the investor does not repay his/her obligations, he/she will incur
a cost δkt to conceal his/her revenue. In this case, the financial intermediary monitors the
investor and is able to capture the investor with a probability of pt+1. Thus, his/her expected
income is given by AΦtkt − δkt + pt+1rt+1bt.
Under this lending contract, the incentive compatibility constraint for the investor not
to default is given by:
AΦtkt + rt+1bt ≥ [AΦt − δ]kt + pt+1rt+1bt, (A1)
or equivalently,
bt ≥ −
δ
rt+1(1− pt+1)
kt, (A2)
The left-hand side of Eq. (A1) represents the revenue that the investor obtains when he/she
invests in a project and consistently pay oﬀ his/her obligations. The right-hand side is the
gain when he/she defaults.
To achieve the probability pt+1 to detect the investor’s concealing his/her revenue, the
financial intermediary incurs an eﬀort cost, btC(pt+1), which is increasing and convex with re-
spect to pt+1. As in Aghion and Banerjee (2005), we assume C(pt+1) = κ log(1−pt+1), where
κ is strictly greater than δ so that our study is meaningful.17 The financial intermediary can
choose an optimal probability by solving a maximization problem such that
max
pt+1
− pt+1rt+1bt − κ log(1− pt+1)bt.
As −bt > 0, this maximization problem is rewritten as:
max
pt+1
pt+1rt+1 + κ log(1− pt+1).
From the first-order condition, we have
rt+1 =
κ
1− pt+1
. (A3)
As the interest rate rt+1 increases, the financial intermediary chooses the high probability to
detect defaulting investors. From Eqs. (A2) and (A3), we obtain:
bt ≥ −
δ
κkt,
17If δ ≥ κ, no investors face binding credit constraints.
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or equivalently,
bt ≥ −
δ
κ− δat. (A4)
As the agent’s productivity Φt is not observable, the financial intermediary does not impose
investor-specific credit constraints. The financial intermediary must know the investors’ net
worth, at. As long as it imposes a credit constraint given by inequality (A4) on all agents,
nobody will default in equilibrium. As δ < κ, we can let θ := δ/(κ− δ) ∈ [0,∞), and thus,
bt ≥ −θat,
which is a credit constraint in the main text. δ and κ are associated with a default cost and
a monitoring cost, respectively. θ represents the extent of the credit constraint.
Microfoundation II
We extend the microfoundation for a credit constraint presented by Antra`s and Caballero
(2009) in a manner suitable for our model. We consider the participation constraint faced
by the financial intermediary and the incentive compatibility constraint of the investors such
that they do not back out of their investment projects.
It is assumed that at the end of time t and after investment has occurred, any investor can
back out of his/her investment project at no cost, taking some fraction of his investments, (1−
μ)(at − bt), where 0 < μ < 1, and not repaying his obligations to the financial intermediary.
In this case, the investor will engage in general goods production somewhere in the economy.
If an investor absconds at the end of time t, the financial intermediary can reclaim the
remainder of investments, μ(wt−bt). It is assumed that the financial intermediary can relend
the remainder of the investments in the financial market. Thus, when making a financial
contract with an investor, the financial intermediary faces a participation constraint such
that:
rt+1μ(at − bt) ≥ −rt+1bt,
or equivalently
bt ≥ −
μ
1− μat.
On the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint for a borrower, such that he/she
does not to abscond from engaging in his/her project at the end of time t, is given by:
AΦt(at − bt) + rt+1bt ≥ AΦt(1− μ)(at − bt). (A5)
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For investors with Φt such that rt+1−μAΦt ≤ 0, Eq. (A5) always holds. Therefore, we focus
on investors with Φt such that rt+1 − μAΦt > 0. Then, Eq. (A5) is rewritten as
bt ≥ −
μ
(φt/Φt)− μat. (A6)
As φt/Φt ≤ 1 in equilibrium, it follows that −μ/((φt/Φt)− μ) ≤ −μ/(1− μ), implying that
Eq. (A6) is redundant. In other words,, if the financial intermediary imposes a credit con-
straint bt ≥ −μat/(1−μ), which is the participation constraint of the financial intermediary,
investors never default. By letting μ/(1−μ) := θ, we obtain the credit constraint bt ≥ −θat,
as shown in the main text. As μ, or equivalently θ, increases, it becomes more diﬃcult for
the investors to withdraw their investment without repaying their obligations.
Proof of Lemma 1
Obviously, there exists a unique value of φ∗ because G(.) is a strictly increasing function over
the support of Φ. Regarding φ∗∗, we note that H(x) := βF (x)/x− [1− μ− β(G(x)− μ)] is
strictly decreasing in (0, b) or (0,∞) because H 0(x) = −βF (x)/x2 < 0 in (0, b) or (0,∞). In
addition, limx→0H(x) = ∞ and limx→∞H(x) = −1 + μ(1 − β) < 0. Therefore, φ∗∗, which
is the solution of H(x) = 0, is uniquely determined. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
Note that because the bubbly steady state exists, it follows that φ∗∗ > φ∗. As shown in
Eq.(18), the growth rate Γt+1 = Yt+1/Yt is given by:
J(φt) := AβF (φt)
1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ) .
From this, we obtain:
J 0(φt) := H(φt) AβφtG
0(φt)
[1− μ− β(G(φt)− μ)]2 ,
where H(φt) = βF (φt)/φt − [1 − μ − β(G(φt) − μ)] as defined in the proof of Lemma 1.
As demonstrated in the proof of lemma 1, H(φt) is strictly decreasing and H(φ∗∗) = 0.
Therefore, J 0(φt) is strictly greater than zero if φ∗ < φt < φ∗∗ and it is strictly less than zero
if φt > φ∗∗. Therefore, the maximum of J(φt) is J(φ∗∗) and of course J(φ∗) < J(φ∗∗). ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
Because πa > 1−πb, it follows that φa > φb. Suppose that φa > φ∗∗. Then, Λ(φa) > Ψ(φa) >
Ψ(φb). However, Eq.(29) does not hold with this inequality. Now, suppose that φa = φ∗∗.
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Then, it must hold that πa = 1, which contradicts the assumption of πa < 1. Therefore,
φa < φ∗∗. Suppose that φb > φ∗. Then, Ψ(φa) > Ψ(φb) > Λ(φb). However, Eq.(30) does
not hold with this inequality. Therefore, only the possible case is that φb = φ∗ and πb = 1.
Conversely, if φb = φ∗ and πb = 1, then there exists {φa,πa}, such that 0 = 1− πb < πa < 1
and Eq.(29) is satisfied. ¤
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Figure 2: Existence of the bubbly steady state 
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